The Sentencing Act 2026 (suspended sentence reforms) has changed how the courts decide whether a custodial sentence is served immediately or suspended in England and Wales. The press has called the changes “soft on crime”. The truth is more practical: this is a prison-capacity reform that creates real opportunities for defendants who are properly represented. This is what the Act changed, who benefits, and how a prepared defence team uses the new framework at sentencing.
A Suspended Sentence Order is a custodial sentence that the court does not enforce immediately, allowing the offender to remain in the community under set conditions. The Sentencing Act 2026 made the most significant change to Suspended Sentence Orders in years. It received Royal Assent on 22 January 2026, and the key suspended-sentence provisions took effect from 22 March 2026. Three changes matter most.
A suspended sentence order could previously only be imposed where the custodial sentence for the offending was two years or less. Generally, any suspended sentence imposed by the court could have been suspended for up to two years. Under the new law, that ceiling rose to three years. Sentences for offences in the newly widened band, which could not previously be suspended, can now be considered for a Suspended Sentence Order, despite crossing the previous two-year threshold.
Where the custodial sentence is 12 months or less, the court must now start from the position that the sentence should be suspended, unless the case is exceptional enough to justify immediate custody. The presumption is rebuttable rather than absolute, and it is subject to statutory exceptions. This is the change driving the “soft on crime” headlines, and it is the most consequential part of the Act for many defendants. It does not mean a suspended sentence is guaranteed, or that for certain offences, prison is automatically avoidable. It means that the starting point for short prison sentences has shifted, and the prosecution now has to make the case for immediate custody rather than the defence having to argue for suspension from a neutral position. The relevant sentencing guidelines from the Sentencing Council continue to apply alongside the new presumption.
The operational period of a Suspended Sentence Order can now run for up to three years, though it may only exceed two years where the custodial term itself exceeds two years. Courts can attach community-based requirements such as Rehabilitation Activity Requirement days (RAR), Unpaid Work Requirement, Alcohol Abstinence and Monitoring, Mental Health Treatment Requirement and Attendance Centre Requirement, similar to those available on a community order. The Act also creates Income Reduction Orders, requiring an offender to pay a percentage of their excess monthly income, but section 3 is not yet in force and no commencement date has been appointed, so that is not an option available to a court today. The suspended sentence order is not a free pass to avoid prison. It carries real conditions, and any breach of the order activates the custodial sentence that was avoided. Certain serious offences are excluded from suspension by statute.
I have read the press coverage carefully. The “soft on crime” framing is not entirely wrong. There is a genuine presumption to suspend short prison sentences now. Though I will add, the framing misses the practical reality: this is a reform driven by prison capacity rather than reduced crime, and the exception that allows immediate custody is where a great deal of the real sentencing work happens for defendants facing sentence.
The suspended-sentence change does not stand alone. The Act is a broad reform of the Sentencing Code, and the other changes affect how a custodial sentence is served.
Corrected on 8 October 2026. This section previously described release under the Act as an “Earned Progression Model” due to be implemented in August 2026, operating as a three-stage process conditional on behaviour in custody and overseen by the Parole Board. That was wrong on both the mechanism and the date, and it is corrected below. Our full account of the release changes is in our guide to prison early release and what changed on 1 October 2026.
The release reform commenced on 1 October 2026, under section 23 of the Act and the Sentencing Act 2026 (Commencement No. 6 and Revocation) Regulations 2026 (SI 2026/953). It changed a fraction, and very little else. For most adult standard determinate sentences the automatic release point fell from 40% or one half to one third. Where release was at two thirds under section 244ZA of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, it is now one half. Section 23 contains no stages, no behaviour test and no Parole Board gateway, and release at the new point is automatic rather than earned in any assessed sense.
The “earned” element that gave the policy its name is a power that already existed: additional days awarded at a prison adjudication. The maximum per proven charge has doubled from 42 to 84 days, with no overall cap. Conduct in custody can therefore push a release date back. It cannot bring one forward.
The change did not reach everyone at once. For a person already in custody on 1 October 2026, it arrives on a date fixed by the length of their sentence, across ten tranches running to 8 June 2027. Sentences for 71 listed offences are excluded outright, including rape, the child sexual offences, indecent images of children and every form of unlawful killing. Extended determinate sentences, life sentences and imprisonment for public protection are untouched, and release in those cases still runs through the Parole Board.
Licence conditions continue to bite after release, and a breach can trigger recall. Since 31 March 2026, fixed term recall for adults on standard determinate sentences lasts 56 days, after which the person is released again. It is a standard recall, not a fixed term recall, that can mean serving the remainder of the sentence in custody, and fixed term recall is not available at all to some, including people managed at MAPPA level 2 or 3, national security and terrorist offenders, and anyone recalled after being charged with a further offence. Four new licence conditions also came into force on 1 October 2026 under section 27: a driving prohibition, a public event attendance prohibition, a prohibition on entering drinking establishments, and a restriction zone enforceable by GPS tag. This is the source of the “33% rule” that has appeared in coverage.
The Act also extends the period for which a court can defer sentence from six to twelve months, amends the Bail Act 1976 so that the “no real prospect” test now applies to convicted individuals awaiting sentencing, and introduces tougher community order options including restriction zone requirements.
For a defendant, the combined effect is that more of the sentencing process is now open to argument. The suspended-sentence presumption, the wider suspendable band, and the lower release point each create a point at which careful sentencing representation can change the outcome.
For defendants facing sentencing in 2026, the practical question is whether the Act improves the chance of avoiding immediate custody. The answer depends on the facts in the case.
For regulated professionals, the change is significant. For a teacher, accountant, doctor, lawyer, financial-services worker, regulated business-individual or sportsperson, the difference between an immediate custodial sentence and a Suspended Sentence Order is often the difference between a destroyed career and one that survives a conviction. A regulator’s response to immediate custody differs materially from its response to a suspended sentence. For this group, the widened band and the presumption to suspend short sentences are meaningful, and in some cases decisive.
The reform matters to defence practice generally. Sentencing submissions, pre-sentence report engagement, and mitigation packages have more purchase now, because the band within which suspension is available is wider and the starting point for short sentences is different. The exceptional-circumstances exception means that the prosecution can still argue for immediate custody, and certain serious offences remain excluded from suspension altogether. The work is in knowing where to draw the line.
For context, this reform sits alongside the wider 2026 legislative wave we have covered, including the new deepfake offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and the procedural reality of voluntary interviews under caution.
Sentencing is where a great deal of the case is decided. The work done between a guilty plea (or conviction) and the sentencing hearing makes a material difference to whether a sentence is served immediately or suspended.
We work proactively. We frontload evidence into sentencing preparation, because by the time the case enters the sentencing courtroom, the room is already mapped and the judge has considered the substantive mitigation dossier uploaded to the court system (whether it is Common Platform for the Magistrates' Court, or the Crown Court Digital Case System). A lot of the 'heavy lifting' already done before the day of your sentencing reduces the significant risk of prison. We leave no stone unturned on the mitigation bundle, analysis of the strengths of the pre-sentence report, the character references, and the medical, psychological and psychiatric evidence where it applies. We do not wait for the court to set the agenda. In fact, in some cases, call character witness evidence to adduce good character thereby further humanising a positive view of the defendant.
In my experience, when one defends clients through sentencing exercises, the outcomes that matter most turn on the work that is invisible within the courtroom. As with anything in life, the more prepared you are, the better the result. Under the new framework, the most important sentencing argument is often whether the exception for immediate custody applies, because that is the test that decides whether a short custodial sentence is suspended or served immediately. A well-prepared sentencing submission, anchored in the relevant sentencing guidelines, is where that argument is won or lost.
“Sentencing is not a single hearing. It is months of preparation that culminates in a hearing. By the time you walk into court, the work has been done, or it has not. We make sure we go above and beyond.”
Akram Mula, founder, Lex Vindico Group
We act for HNW individuals and regulated professionals across medicine, finance, law, sport, and senior executive roles. The discretion required at sentencing runs through our criminal defence practice. Our team is led by Akram Mula, a Solicitor Advocate and former CPS-approved prosecutor. Having sat on the prosecution side and moved to defence, we know what the prosecutor at sentencing is arguing and what the sentencing judge is reading.
The Act introduces reforms to Suspended Sentence Orders (raising the maximum suspendable term to three years and creating a presumption to suspend sentences of 12 months or less), lowers the automatic release point for most standard determinate sentences to one third, extends deferred sentences from six to twelve months, and amends the Bail Act 1976. It is a broad reform of the sentencing code driven in large part by prison capacity.
Yes. The maximum custodial term that can be suspended rose from two years to a maximum period of three years. A sentence in that newly widened band can be considered for a Suspended Sentence Order, subject to the court’s assessment of the case, and depending upon the offence committed.
For custodial sentences of 12 months or less, the sentencing court now starts from a presumption that the sentence should be suspended, unless it finds a justification for immediate custody. The presumption applies where the offender was convicted on or after 22 March 2026. This is the most significant practical change for short custodial sentences.
The suspended-sentence presumption applies by reference to the date of conviction, not the date of sentence, and not the date of the offence. An offender convicted on or after 22 March 2026 has the benefit of it; an offender convicted before that date does not, even if they are sentenced afterwards. Cases part-heard at commencement need careful handling, and we recommend taking advice on the specific position.
It refers to the release change that commenced on 1 October 2026 under section 23 of the Act. For most adult standard determinate sentences, the automatic release point fell to one third of the sentence. Release at that point is automatic: there is no behaviour test, no set of stages to progress through and no Parole Board gateway in the section. Conduct in custody can still push the date back, because additional days can be awarded at a prison adjudication, now up to 84 per proven charge with no overall cap. Sentences for 71 listed offences are excluded, and extended determinate sentences, life sentences and IPP are unaffected.
Yes, for most adults serving standard determinate sentences, from 1 October 2026. It is automatic rather than earned, and it is not overseen by the Parole Board. For people already in custody on that date, the change arrives on a date fixed by sentence length, in ten tranches running to 8 June 2027, so many have not reached it yet. Our guide to prison early release sets out the tranche dates and the excluded offences in full.
The custody threshold is the legal test a sentencing court applies before imposing any custodial sentence: the offence must be so serious that neither a fine nor a community order can be justified in the circumstances. The Act did not lower that threshold. It changed what happens once a short custodial sentence has been decided upon.
Section 45 deals with the deportation of foreign national offenders. It amends section 38 of the UK Borders Act 2007 so that a person who receives a suspended sentence of 12 months or more becomes liable to automatic deportation, and it amends section 117D(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 so that such a person falls within the definition of a “foreign criminal” for the Article 8 public interest test. It came into force on 22 March 2026 and does not apply to sentences imposed for offences for which the person was convicted before that date. The duty can still be displaced where removal would breach the person’s rights under the European Convention on Human Rights or the UK’s obligations under the Refugee Convention. For anyone who is not a British or Irish citizen, this makes the length of a suspended sentence, and not only whether it is suspended, a central issue at sentencing.
Yes. A Suspended Sentence Order carries conditions, and the operational period can now run for up to three years. If the defendant breaches the conditions, such as failing to engage with the Probation Service, failing to attend a RAR day without reasonable excuse, or committing a further offence during the operational period of the SSO, there is a significant risk that the court will activate the original custodial term and require it to be served immediately. In that situation, a thorough mitigation dossier could mean that we are able to persuade the judge to give a second chance before activating the suspended sentence order.
Lex Vindico Group is a London-based criminal defence firm, founded by Akram Mula. We act for HNW individuals and regulated professionals across the UK and internationally, concentrated where the stakes are highest: pre-charge representation, sexual offences defence, financial crime, and serious crime.
What we offer at the sentencing stage is rare in one firm: a proactive defence stance that prepares the sentencing hearing as carefully as a trial, the operational discretion that HNW and regulated-professional work demands, and direct courtroom experience including a former CPS-approved prosecutor at the head of the firm.
We are not the cheapest firm in London. We are the firm to instruct when the sentencing hearing will decide more than the trial did.
The window between conviction (or plea) and the sentencing hearing is where the most can be done. Whether your sentence sits within the suspendable band or close to it, the argument on whether immediate custody is justified can decide the outcome. Even where the sentence length is not within the suspendable range, our lawyers can help you argue lower harm and lower culpability and even, a 'written basis' which essentially compels the judge to a particular lower sentence bracket. If you have any particular concerns, please get in touch with our team now.
We offer confidential consultations, in person at our London offices or remotely by secure call. Initial enquiries are handled discreetly and quickly.
If you are facing sentencing and these changes are in play for your case, the work we do in the weeks before the hearing changes the room you walk into. Speak to us today.
Lex Vindico Group is regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority. We represent individuals nationally across England and Wales in criminal, regulatory, and parallel-proceedings defence at every stage, and most decisively, at the pre-charge stage.
This article is written by Akram Mula, LLM, Solicitor Advocate and CPS-approved Prosecutor, founder of Lex Vindico Group. It is general legal information about the Sentencing Act 2026, not legal advice on any specific case. It was corrected on 8 October 2026; the correction is noted in the text. For advice on your individual circumstances, contact our team directly.

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